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1. Introduction
Following the 1997 Asian financial crises, the
World Bank, IMF and the OECD required Asian
nations, including Singapore, to address shortcom-
ings in corporate regulations. Among others,
Singapore responded by reforming corporate dis-
closure regulations and introducing the Code of
Corporate Governance (the Code) in 2001.
Compliance by listed companies is encouraged by
the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX). The Code
addresses four areas of governance, namely, board
of directors, remuneration, accountability and
audit, and communication with shareholders. The
nature of corporate governance set out in the 
Code follows the Anglo-American model because
Singapore is an international financial hub. It hosts
many multinational companies and has a globally-
oriented financial market.
The roles of the board of directors and its sub
committees, such as the audit committee, outlined
in the Singapore Code are similar to the US
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) (SOX) and the
Combined Code (2006) of the UK. For example,
the board and audit committee are responsible for
ensuring the quality of the financial reporting sys-
tem, the integrity and effectiveness of the internal
control system, and appointing and remunerating
the auditors. There are, however, some differences
between the corporate governance environment in
the US/UK and Singapore. Unlike the US, compli-
ance with the Singapore Code is not mandatory.
The Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) requires
companies to disclose their corporate governance
practices and to explain non-compliance in their
annual reports. The Singapore Code does not have
legal force, unlike SOX in the US. The guidelines
in the Singapore Code are principles-based which
companies can tailor to their needs. The SOX, on
the other hand, takes a prescriptive rules-based 
approach that companies must follow. For exam-
ple, Section 404 of SOX requires auditors to attest
to management’s assessment of internal controls
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 38. No. 2. pp. 105-120. 2008 105
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over financial reporting. There is no such require-
ment in the Singapore Code. Finally, non-compli-
ance with SOX in the US has serious potential
consequences including financial penalties and
imprisonment for management and those responsi-
ble for overseeing compliance. The Singapore
Code does not specify such consequences.
These illustrative differences suggest that in an
institutional environment where corporate gover-
nance rules are mandated by law, non-compliance
has serious ramifications for management and
those responsible for overseeing compliance.
Therefore, auditors are expected to pay attention to
corporate governance practices in such a setting.
In an institutional setting where the adoption and
monitoring of corporate governance practices is
not mandatory and lacks legislative force, such as
Singapore, it is not clear how auditors would react
to voluntary adoption of principles-based guide-
lines. Singapore firms may implement governance
mechanisms that appear to comply with the Code
but in substance are ‘tools’ for managerial en-
trenchment. Such conditions raise an empirical
question about how the market and agencies such
as auditors perceive corporate governance struc-
tures implemented by Singapore companies.
In this study, we address the empirical question
of how the strength of non-mandatory corporate
governance affects Singapore auditors’ judgments.
We extend prior research (e.g. Cohen and Hanno,
2000) by examining a more comprehensive set of
corporate governance factors, more recent data in
a period of significant reforms, and a different in-
stitutional setting. The extent to which auditors in
Singapore would rely on their clients’ governance
mechanisms is unclear for two main reasons. First,
auditors in Singapore are cognisant of the non-
mandatory status of corporate governance prac-
tices and the discretion afforded to management 
in the implementation and assessment of such
practices. Consequently, Singapore auditors may 
‘discount’ and pay less attention to corporate gov-
ernance in their audit client risk assessments. On
the other hand, the ‘push’ for reforms by the World
Bank, IMF and OECD particularly in Asia, and
significant governance developments in the US
and the UK may influence Singapore auditors to
pay more attention to corporate governance as it 
is the apex of a firm’s control environment. An 
incentive for auditors to focus on corporate gover-
nance is the presence of large US and UK multi-
national firms operating in Singapore as failure to
do so could result in adverse economic conse-
quences (i.e. lost fee revenues from audit and con-
sulting). Second, the small body of prior research
based in the US does not provide sufficient and un-
equivocal empirical evidence to suggest that audi-
tors plan their audit according to their perceptions
of the strength of a client’s corporate governance.
More importantly, we do not know whether, and to
what extent, the results of the limited research in
the US can generalise to a non-mandatory corpo-
rate governance setting such as Singapore. Our
study also responds to the calls by Bedard and
Johnstone (2004), Cohen et al. (2004) and DeFond
and Francis (2005) for further research to enhance
our understanding of the role of corporate gover-
nance in the financial reporting and assurance
process, and to provide guidance to policy-makers
and audit practice.
Sixty audit managers from three Big 4 audit
firms are randomly allocated to one of three ex-
perimental treatment conditions – weak, moderate
and strong corporate governance. Our results show
significant differences in auditors’ client accept-
ance, risk and planning judgments across the ex-
perimental conditions. We observe that auditors
make more favourable client acceptance, risk and
planning judgments when corporate governance is
stronger. The results generally suggest that audi-
tors adopt strategies responsive to the strength of a
client’s corporate governance. Section 2 of the
paper reviews the relevant prior literature and de-
velops the hypotheses. We then describe the re-
search design and method (Section 3) followed by
the results (Section 4). Section 5 concludes with a
discussion of the findings and opportunities for
further research.
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
development
In this section, we review the prior behavioural lit-
erature on corporate governance and audit judg-
ments. We also describe the agency and resource
dependence theories, which provide the founda-
tion for our hypotheses. We view the agency and
resource dependence theories as complementary
because they provide explanations incremental to
each other on various aspects of a firm’s environ-
ment and corporate governance. Boards conduct
monitoring activities (agency view) and provide
resources (resource dependence view). Hillman
and Dalziel (2003) contend that research that does
not integrate the agency and resource dependence
theories are myopic and such studies provide an
incomplete understanding of corporate gover-
nance.
2.1. Corporate governance and the audit process
A significant body of academic research has
emerged on the relationship between corporate
governance and the financial reporting process
(e.g. Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley
et al., 1999; Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2004).
Although the audit process is a vital component of
the financial reporting process, there is a paucity
of research on corporate governance and audit
judgments (Bedard and Johnstone, 2004; Cohen 
106 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:52
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
et al., 2004; DeFond and Francis, 2005). We re-
view the relevant behavioural studies to date.
Cohen and Hanno (2000) investigate the impact
of the quality of corporate governance and man-
agement control philosophy on pre-planning and
planning judgments. Their results show that audi-
tors are more likely to accept clients and reduce
substantive testing for clients with stronger corpo-
rate governance. Contrary to expectations and pro-
fessional guidance statements, no conclusive
effects are observed on the timing of testing.
Cohen et al. (2002) interview auditors to explore
the impact of corporate governance on the audit
process. They report that all respondents, includ-
ing seniors, managers and partners collect and use
governance information when making their audit
decisions. Their interviewees state that audit com-
mittees are ineffective and of secondary impor-
tance because they lack authoritative power.
Cohen et al. (2002) report that auditors may in-
crease their reliance on the audit committee if they
are entrusted with greater power and responsibili-
ties over the financial reporting process.
Finally, Cohen et al. (2007) investigate the 
impact of board focus (agency and/or resource 
dependence) on auditors’ program planning judg-
ments. In their experimental study, 68 audit part-
ners and managers evaluate a case where the focus
of the board is manipulated in a 22 between-sub-
jects design: agency focus (stronger or weaker)
and resource dependence focus (stronger or weak-
er). Their results show that when the board is as-
sessed as stronger on the agency and resource
dependence dimensions, auditors decrease planned
audit hours. However, they find no significant ef-
fect of the board on inherent risk but some evi-
dence of the effect of the board on control risk at
conventional significance levels.
2.2. Corporate governance and client acceptance
judgment
The client acceptance judgment is a critical first
phase in the audit firm’s risk management process,
given the increasing risk of litigation and account-
ing scandals. Audit firms continue to devote 
considerable attention to the client acceptance
judgment by evaluating client-related risks and
adopting audit strategies to manage such risks to
acceptable levels (Johnstone and Bedard, 2003;
Bell et al., 1997). However, little is known about
how auditors make the client acceptance judgment
(Johnstone, 2000) and particularly so in the current
environment with client-business risk at height-
ened levels (Bedard and Johnstone, 2004).
When making the client acceptance judgment,
auditors assess the engagement risk associated
with a potential client. Engagement risk comprises
three components: client’s business risk, audit risk
and auditor’s business risk (Johnstone, 2000).2
Johnstone (2000) shows that partners evaluate
client-related risks to assess the audit firm’s busi-
ness risk in making a client acceptance judgment.
However, she also finds that partners do not use
proactive risk-adaptation strategies (e.g. adjusting
the audit fee) to mediate the risk effects of the
client acceptance judgment. Similarly, Johnstone
and Bedard (2003) find that auditors do not adopt
risk-adaptation strategies when making client ac-
ceptance judgments. Rather, auditors concentrate
on identifying and screening out clients with unac-
ceptable risks.
As the strength of the board of directors and
audit committee is significantly associated with
the quality of the financial reports (e.g. Beasley,
1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 1999;
Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2004), it potentially af-
fects auditors’ risk assessments. These findings in
the literature are consistent with the agency view
of the board and audit committee. Fama (1980)
and Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that a firm’s in-
ternal governance plays an important role in shap-
ing and enhancing effective operation of its
internal control system. The board of directors,
through the audit committee, is the primary inter-
nal governance mechanism that is responsible for
the effective oversight of the overall control envi-
ronment. The effectiveness of this oversight func-
tion is largely dependent on the independence of
the directors serving on the board and the audit
committee (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Such independence comes from outside directors
who have incentives to protect their reputation and
avoid litigation risk.
Given the link between a client’s strategies and
the assertions in the financial statements, Bell et al.
(1997) highlight the necessity for auditors to un-
derstand and place more weight on the processes
that determine a client’s business strategies. This
implies that auditors should consider a firm’s cor-
porate governance because resource dependence
theory posits that the board of directors plays a
major role in setting and monitoring the firm’s
strategies and how the firm positions itself in its
business environment to achieve its objectives
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman
and Dalziel, 2003). Resource dependence theory
embraces the view that board members enhance
the value of the firm through developing and mon-
itoring a firm’s strategic responses to deal with the
dynamic and competitive environment. Pfeffer
Vol. 38 No. 2. 2008 107
2 Client business risk is the risk that the client’s economic
condition will deteriorate in either the short or long term.
Audit risk is the risk that the auditor fails to appropriately
modify his opinion on financial statements that are materially
misstated. Auditor’s business risk is the risk that the audit firm
will suffer a loss from the engagement, arising either from a
lack of engagement profitability or future litigation
(Johnstone, 2000).
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(1972), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Hillman and
Dalziel (2003), and recent studies in accounting
utilising resource dependence theory (Sharma,
2006; Cohen et al., 2007) argue that the ability of
the directors to perform this role is dependent on
their experience, industry knowledge and their un-
derstanding of the economic climate.
The economic consequences of the adopted
strategies are reported in the financial statements.
Thus, auditors may assess whether the firm is tak-
ing advantage of the resourcefulness and expertise
of the board of directors to develop strategies 
to ensure its continuity as a going concern. If a
client’s economic condition deteriorates due to
poor business strategies, the likelihood of financial
misreporting and audit engagement risk are likely
to increase. Since performance declines and finan-
cial misreporting are associated with relatively
weaker corporate governance, we expect, ceteris
paribus, client-related risks to decline in a stronger
governance environment. Therefore, we hypothe-
sise that:
H1: Stronger (weaker) corporate governance
[board of directors and audit committee] will
lead to more (less) favourable client accept-
ance recommendation.
2.3. Corporate governance and risk assessments
Corporate governance is an important entity-
level factor that sets the tone for the overall control
environment that has significant implications for
auditors’ risk judgments. We jointly examine con-
trol environment and inherent risk judgments since
Messier and Austen (2000) find a knowledge-
based dependence between auditors’ assessment of
inherent risk and control environment risk. We
focus on entity-level risk assessments because cor-
porate governance provides holistic monitoring of
a client’s control environment and the financial re-
porting process. Therefore, our reference to inher-
ent risk and control environment risk is made at
the entity level rather than at a particular transac-
tion cycle level.
Inherent risk is a function of how a client re-
sponds to risks in its business environment. The
strategic business process model suggests that or-
ganisations develop and modify strategies to fit its
environment (Bell et al., 1997). The board of di-
rectors plays an important role in this process and
thus it could influence auditors’ assessment of in-
herent risk. A stronger board of directors with rel-
evant industry knowledge and experience is in a
better position to manage strategies responsive to
the environment (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003;
Sharma, 2006; Cohen et al., 2007). Such clients
may be assessed lower inherent risk because they
are less likely to face financial difficulties and en-
gage in financial misreporting.
A weaker internal control environment is likely
to be associated with higher control environment
risk (Cohen and Hanno, 2000; Cohen et al., 2007)
and greater likelihood of financial misreporting
(Beasley, 1996). The strength of corporate gover-
nance is likely to affect auditors’ control environ-
ment risk assessment because a strong (weak)
board and audit committee are part of the overall
control environment that provide the backbone for
the effective (ineffective) operation of internal
controls (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983;
Cohen and Hanno, 2000; Cohen et al., 2007).
Authoritative guidance statements (e.g. COSO,
1992; SOX, 2002) empower the board and audit
committee to oversee the internal control system
and management’s financial reporting policies.
The audit committee also mediates disagreements
between the auditor and management with prior
research showing a strong audit committee sup-
porting the auditor (Carcello and Neal, 2000;
2003). This discussion suggests the following hy-
pothesis: 
H2: Stronger (weaker) corporate governance
[board of directors and audit committee] will
lead to lower (higher) inherent risk and con-
trol environment risk assessments.
2.4. Corporate governance and audit planning
judgments
Professional standards require auditors to per-
form auditing procedures designed to reduce
client-related risks to an acceptable level. As audi-
tors’ assessment of client-related risks increases,
the level of audit effort required increases.
Although theoretical predictions are quite clear,
the empirical evidence in prior studies is unclear
about auditors’ sensitivity to client risk factors.3
More importantly, we know very little about how
a client’s corporate governance, a client-risk fac-
tor, affects audit planning judgments. Auditing
standards require auditors to understand sufficient-
ly the components of internal control and to utilise
this knowledge in making judgments concerning
the nature, timing, and extent of substantive test-
ing. Thus, corporate governance, which is often re-
garded as the apex of a firm’s internal control
system (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983),
should affect the extent and timing of audit testing.
108 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
3 Behavioural experiments generally report evidence of risk
responsiveness in planning judgments (e.g. Messier and
Plumlee, 1987; Maletta and Kida, 1993; Zimbelman, 1997;
Johnstone, 2000). However, archival studies report results in-
dicating auditors’ risk responsiveness are mixed. Some recent
studies such as Bell et al. (2001) and Johnstone and Bedard
(2001) report that auditors adapt their planning judgments to
assessed risks, while other studies report that they do not (e.g.
Mock and Wright, 1993). See also Bedard et al. (1999) for a
comprehensive review of the related literature.
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2.4.1. Corporate governance and extent of
planned substantive testing 
To our knowledge, the small body of literature
examining the impact of corporate governance on
substantive testing is based in the US. Therefore,
we do not know whether the results observed in
the US, where corporate governance standards are
mandated, can be generalised to a non-mandatory
corporate governance setting such as Singapore.
As explained earlier, because auditors in
Singapore may either ‘discount’ or emphasise a
client’s corporate governance when making audit
judgments (see ‘Introduction’ section), we do not
know the extent to which corporate governance
would influence auditors’ substantive test judg-
ments. Furthermore, the results of prior studies are
inconsistent and are probably due to the different
perspectives taken by the researchers. These stud-
ies adopt either a risk-based or a demand-based
perspective. The three behavioural studies to date
employ the risk-based perspective. Cohen et al.
(2002: 580) adopt a risk-based perspective and
propose that:
‘For governance factors to affect audit plans, the
auditor must first recognize and properly assess
the strength of corporate governance and, sec-
ond, appropriately weight and use this evidence
to develop an audit plan. If the governance struc-
ture is strong, an auditor could potentially re-
duce sample sizes (e.g. number of locations
visited for the evaluation of inventory) and thus
reduce the extent of costly substantive testing.’
Cohen and Hanno (2000) report results consis-
tent with the risk-based perspective described
above by showing that corporate governance has a
direct significant effect on auditors’ planned extent
of substantive tests. More recently, Cohen et al.
(2007) show that a client characterised by a board
with stronger agency focus and resource depend-
ence focus reduces the number of planned audit
hours compared to a typical audit.
Adopting a demand-based perspective in their
archival study, Carcello et al. (2002) examine the
relationship between board characteristics and
audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. They find
that a stronger board demands closer audit scruti-
ny and quality which suggests greater audit effort
by the external auditor and higher audit fees. In
contrast, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) do not ob-
serve significant direct effects between corporate
governance and audit effort and audit billing rate,
implying that there is limited support for the de-
mand-based perspective. They suggest the risk-
based approach provides a more plausible
explanation of the association between corporate
governance and audit effort expended on audit
tests.
We adopt a risk-based perspective as our study
examines auditors’ perceptions and responsive
adaptation to a client’s corporate governance. Our
position is further supported by auditors increas-
ingly placing more focus on the risk-driven ap-
proach in conducting their audit (Bell et al., 1997;
Cohen et al., 2002). A risky client will require
greater audit effort in order to reduce audit risk to
an acceptable level. The agency and resource de-
pendence theories suggest that stronger boards of
directors and audit committees are associated with
stronger controls and lower risks of financial mis-
reporting. Such beliefs could result in greater re-
liance on internal controls and lower planned
substantive testing. Thus, we hypothesise that:
H3a: Stronger (weaker) corporate governance
[board of directors and audit committee] will
lead to greater (lower) auditor reliance on in-
ternal control.
H3b: Stronger (weaker) corporate governance
[board of directors and audit committee] will
lead to less (more) extensive substantive
audit testing.
2.4.2. Corporate governance and timing of 
substantive testing
Investigating the timing of audit testing is im-
portant because the timing of substantive proce-
dures has implications for audit efficiency and
effectiveness. For instance, emphasis on year-end
testing can increase staff hours, impose pressures
to meet deadlines, and create staff shortages
(McNair, 1991). The study on governance and the
timing of audit testing by Cohen and Hanno (2000)
finds significant uncertainty and lack of consensus
regarding the effects of corporate governance on
adjustments to the timing of audit testing. 
We propose that if auditors perceive stronger
corporate governance, then more substantive test-
ing may be shifted to interim periods. Although
clients are more likely to manipulate their earnings
near the financial year-end, the agency view sug-
gests that stronger boards of directors and audit
committees reduce such efforts and lead to higher
earnings quality (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Dechow et
al., 1996; Beasley et al,. 1999; Klein, 2002; Abbott
et al., 2004). Effective monitoring by the board
and audit committee increases the strength of the
internal controls and reduces the risk of material
misstatements. Under such conditions, auditors are
likely to perform more substantive tests during the
interim period. This leads to our final hypothesis:
H4: Stronger (weaker) corporate governance
[board of directors and audit committee] will
lead to auditors conducting more (less) sub-
stantive testing during the interim period.
Vol. 38 No. 2. 2008 109
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3. Research design and method
3.1. Experiment overview
We randomly assigned participants to one of
three experimental conditions: weak, moderate or
strong corporate governance. All participants in
the experiment received detailed information on a
prospective client’s board of directors and audit
committee, and other background information to
make judgments pertaining to client acceptance,
risk, and audit planning related to the extent and
timing of substantive tests. Background informa-
tion, such as management integrity, industry,
client size and financial health of the client, is
held constant across experimental conditions
since our main objective is to analyse the effect of
corporate governance on auditors’ judgments.
These variables are selected based on our review
of the prior literature. We provide the same back-
ground description of the hypothetical client in
the experimental instrument for each treatment
condition. Client background information provid-
ed to participants include products manufactured,
industry information (intensity of competition,
major competitors and their market share, client’s
market share), size (number of employees),
founding year and listing status, ownership data,
management integrity, and predecessor auditor.
We also provide financial statements containing
two years of data and financial ratios for each year
including the percentage change from the prior
year and industry comparatives. The hypothetical
company, Alpha Ltd, is a recently-listed manufac-
turer of computer hardware components and has
moderate financial health.4 The research instru-
ment, including the debriefing and demographic
questions, is developed in consultation with the
participating Big 4 firms.
3.2. Participants
Audit managers from three of the Big 4 audit
firms in Singapore participated in the study. We li-
aised with the contact partner or manager at each
firm. In our preliminary discussions and during the
pilot tests, we canvassed usual experimental issues
with emphasis on auditors’ understanding of cor-
porate governance and its implications for finan-
cial reporting and the external audit. Each
participating audit firm provided considerable in-
house and external training to their auditors on
corporate governance issues. We also reviewed
Big 4 firms’ publications that disseminate corpo-
rate governance developments to staff and clients.
We include only audit managers in our study and
exclude lower level staff as the latter are less like-
ly to have sufficient experience and knowledge to
address corporate governance issues and make ap-
propriate planning and client acceptance judg-
ments. 
All participants hold a university degree and
57% are males. The mean audit experience of the
managers is 7.15, 5.98 and 7.37 years, respective-
ly for the weak, moderate and strong governance
treatment conditions. The use of audit managers is
appropriate for reasons that they work closely with
audit partners and assist in the client acceptance
judgment. The audit managers indicated that they
have prior involvement in the client acceptance
process. At least 50% of the participants had dis-
cussed issues related to client acceptance with ex-
ternal parties such as prior auditors, bankers, and
lawyers; 80% had previously evaluated a new
client’s financial status; 88% had gathered back-
ground information on a potential client; 88% pre-
viously evaluated a new client’s internal control
environment; and 92% of auditors had prior expe-
rience evaluating a new client’s financial reporting
system. Although audit partners make the final
client acceptance decisions, only in exceptional
circumstances would they deviate from the audit
managers’ recommendations. ANOVA results
show no significant differences (p > 0.10) among
the three treatment conditions with respect to the
various activities and the experience (in years) 
of the audit managers. This suggests our random
allocation is successful.
We conducted the pilot study and experiment in
December 2002, following the publication of the
Singapore Code in early 2001. The Big 4 in
Singapore implemented specialist corporate gov-
ernance teams/centres following the Asian finan-
cial crisis and injected further resources when the
Singapore governance code was first drafted.
Experimental instruments were delivered to each
of the audit firm’s representative in random order.5
We instructed the representatives to randomly dis-
tribute the sealed envelopes containing the experi-
mental instrument. All responses were anonymous
and confidential. The research instruments ask
participants to complete the experimental tasks in-
dividually and without discussion with their peers.
As the participants completed the experimental
tasks in their own time, we were unable to verify
individual completion. Our discussion with the
contact person at each of the participating Big 4
110 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
4 We determined Alpha’s moderate financial health by de-
veloping its financial statements based on industry averages
and reviewing several listed companies’ financial statements.
We resized the draft financial statements and included them
with selected financial ratios in our pilot tests. Using a seven-
point scale for the financial items anchored (1) very low to (7)
very high, several audit partners (n=4) and managers (n=9)
participating in our pilot tests assessed the financial health of
Alpha as moderate. These auditors were provided the com-
plete experimental instrument and made their judgments on
the items and scales as described in the method section. The
mean for the four financial status items ranged between 3.46
and 4.18.
5 The experimental instrument is available upon request
from the corresponding author.
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firms before and after the experiment did not indi-
cate any problem with task completion.6
We achieved a response rate of 58% based on the
distribution of 105 research instruments.7 We re-
moved one incomplete instrument which resulted
in 60 usable responses that are equally distributed
across the three experimental conditions. We could
not ask for more participants because of resource
constraints expressed by the participating firms.
Although we do not achieve our minimum sample
size per cell, our post hoc power and effect size
analyses reported in the ‘Results’ section indicate
that we achieved high power and large effects.
Accordingly, we do not need a larger sample size
per cell (Cohen, 1988).
3.3. Independent variables
The experimental treatment in our study is the
strength of corporate governance manipulated as
weak, moderate or strong along dimensions of cor-
porate governance that are identical across our
three experimental conditions. Our experimental
construct is based on corporate governance regula-
tions, findings in the prior literature (Carcello and
Neal, 2000; Cohen and Hanno, 2000; Cohen et al.,
2002; Carcello and Neal, 2003; Bedard and
Johnstone, 2004) and governance practices by
companies. The three experimental conditions
with respect to board and audit committee charac-
teristics are summarised in Exhibit 1. We include a
column in Exhibit 1 that relates the various dimen-
sions of corporate governance to the agency and
resource dependence theories and are identified as
‘agency’ and ‘resource’, respectively, and those re-
lated to both are identified as ‘agency & resource’.
The column also identifies the theoretical con-
struct (e.g. independence, expertise, experience,
reputation) associated with the governance dimen-
sions.
We provide descriptive information about the
activities of the board and audit committee, and
background information of each director such as
their experience, qualifications and outside direc-
torships. Some of the corporate governance infor-
mation presented in the experimental instruments
is commonly disclosed in annual reports. Based on
such information, participants in the experiment
have to form their own judgments about the 
effectiveness of the hypothetical client’s corporate 
governance. This is reflective of the condition 
in practice where auditors assess the strength of
corporate governance based on their observations
of directors’ characteristics such as independence,
experience, expertise and reputation. Participants
are not specifically told whether the board or audit
committee is effective in discharging its responsi-
bilities. By doing so, we also minimise any inter-
nal validity threats arising from demand
characteristics.
3.4. Dependent variables
The dependent variables comprise client accept-
ance, risk, and audit planning judgments. They 
are elicited based on questions in the research 
instrument.8 The first question asks respondents 
to indicate on a six-point scale whether they rec-
ommend accepting or rejecting the client, where
one to three are categorised on the scale as ‘reject’,
and four to six are categorised as ‘accept’.9 For the
purposes of statistical analysis, a higher number
represents a more favourable client acceptance
recommendation. An even-numbered scale ensures
respondents make a choice between accept or 
reject.
For the remainder of the judgment tasks, partic-
ipants respond on a seven-point Likert scale rang-
ing from ‘very low’ (1) to ‘very high’ (7).10 The
second question asks participants to rate the in-
tegrity of management followed by questions re-
lated to inherent risk and control environment risk.
Control environment risk as elicited in our experi-
ment is more narrowly defined as the risk relating
to the control environment. As this definition is
limited to entity-level risk, our results may not be
comparable to prior research that examines control
risk at the specific financial statement assertion
level. Participants are also required to make four
audit planning judgments. These four questions
comprise the extent of auditor’s planned reliance
on the client’s internal controls, the number of
planned audit hours required to complete the audit,
the extent of planned substantive tests, and the 
extent of substantive tests planned for the year-end
audit.
Vol. 38 No. 2. 2008 111
6 We assess random distribution of audit managers from the
three Big 4 audit firms across the three experimental condi-
tions and find the Chi-square statistic is not significant (χ2 =
6.976, p = 0.14). We also included audit firm affiliation as a
covariate in all our analyses and find it is not significant in all
tests nor does it influence our results in any way.
7 To ensure our statistical analyses have sufficient statistical
power for making valid inferences, we estimated our sample
size for each cell based on a range of medium (f = 0.25) to
large (f = 0.40) effect size and high statistical power (0.80) at
an alpha of 5%. A practically meaningful effect size in the so-
cial sciences is greater than a small effect size (see Cohen,
1988 for details). Using these parameters and tables in Cohen
(1988), we estimated a minimum sample size of 21 and max-
imum of 52 participants per cell.
8 We include a question asking respondents to assess the in-
tegrity of management, a variable we control. We include this
question here rather than as part of our manipulation check
questions because auditors in our pilot test stated this is one of
the foremost client factors they evaluate.
9 Although the accept/reject scale had an increasing order, 1
at the reject end and 6 at the accept end, the respondents
formed their own interpretations of the meaning of the num-
bers 1–3 in the reject region, and 4–6 in the accept region. 
10 In practice, auditors use scales with verbal anchors such
as ‘low’, ‘moderate’ and ‘high’ when making audit judgments.
Consistent with the prior literature, we attach numerical an-
chors to facilitate statistical analyses.
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3.5. Pilot test
Thirteen auditors from the Big 4 firms not taking
part in the main study pre-tested the experimental
instruments. We also asked them to consider the
realism of the case, the nature and amount of in-
formation provided including the background, cor-
porate governance and financial results of the
client. They were also asked to comment on their
understanding and order of the audit judgment
questions. Following the pilot-test, we made some
editorial changes to the research instruments and
added the notes accompanying the complete finan-
cial statements. Our discussions with the auditors
indicated they had no problems understanding the
case and the questions. They confirmed that the
nature and sequence of the questions follow prac-
tice although they mentioned that some judgments
(e.g. risk assessments) are made simultaneously.
4. Results
4.1. Manipulation check and descriptive statistics
We check the manipulation of our experimental
treatments based on participants’ rating of each of
the following: (i) the overall strength of the client’s
corporate governance (GOV)11 (ii) board of direc-
tors (BOD) and; (iii) the audit committee (AC) on
separate seven-point Likert scales ranging from
‘very low’ (1) to ‘very high’ (7). Since these are re-
lated variables, we perform a MANOVA (Wilks’
Lambda statistical test) followed by post-hoc
tests.12
The MANOVA results show that our manipula-
tion of governance is significantly different (Wilks’
Lambda = 0.29, F = 24.0, p < 0.01) across the
treatment conditions for GOV, BOD and AC. The
group means (SD) for GOV are 2.65 (0.745), 4.05
(1.099) and 5.10 (0.718) for the weak, moderate
and strong corporate governance treatment condi-
tions, respectively. The group means (SD) for BOD
are 2.80 (0.834), 4.20 (0.951) and 5.25 (0.967) for
the weak, moderate and strong treatment condi-
tions, respectively. For AC, the group means (SD)
are 2.25 (0.851), 4.35 (1.040) and 5.55 (0.945) for
the weak, moderate and strong treatment condi-
tions, respectively. Our post-hoc tests of mean dif-
ferences show significant differences (p < 0.01) in
participants’ ratings for both BOD and AC be-
tween the weak and strong, weak and moderate, as
well as moderate and strong governance treatment
conditions. We conclude that participants perceived
the strength of the board and audit committee as
intended by our experimental manipulations. 
We also ask participants to rate the financial sta-
tus of the hypothetical client on four dimensions
(i.e. profitability, liquidity, leverage and operating
activity) that are held constant across the three
treatment conditions. We find no significant differ-
ences in participants’ ratings of financial status
across the three treatment conditions.13 Recall that
participants also rate the integrity of management
as part of their audit judgments, consistent with
what auditors do in practice. We observe some dif-
ferences in management integrity ratings but these
are significant (p < 0.05) between the weak and
strong governance conditions only. When we in-
clude management integrity as a covariate in our
analyses, it is not significant and it does not quali-
tatively affect the effects of corporate gover-
nance.14
Table 1 presents the correlation matrix for all the
dependent variables. The data in Table 1 show sig-
nificant correlations among the audit judgment
variables. For example, control environment risk is
highly and positively correlated with the extent of
planned substantive testing (r = 0.47, p < 0.01).
This is not unexpected as audit judgments are inter-
related. We design and use appropriate statistical
analyses that consider these inter-relationships.
4.2. Test of hypotheses
4.2.1. Corporate governance and client 
acceptance judgments 
The ANOVA results in Table 2, Panel A show that
corporate governance (GOVSGH)15 significantly
influences auditors’ client acceptance judgment (F
= 11.356, p < 0.01). The means (SD) for the AC-
CEPT judgment in Table 2, Panel B are 3.95
(0.826), 4.85 (0.671) and 4.95 (0.686) for the weak,
moderate and strong governance treatment condi-
tions, respectively. The results for test of H1 in
Table 2 show a significant difference (p < 0.01) for
ACCEPT across the corporate governance treat-
ment conditions. The post-hoc analyses in Panel C
show significant differences (p < 0.01) between the
weak and strong, and between the weak and mod-
erate corporate governance conditions. On the
other hand, ACCEPT is not significantly different
between the strong and moderate treatment condi-
tions. The results suggest that auditors make more
favourable client acceptance recommendations
114 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
11
‘Overall governance refers to a respondent’s total percep-
tion of the combination of: activities and composition of the
client’s board of directors; the audit committee; and the back-
ground of the directors.
12 MANOVA is a multiple analysis of variance test and is
used when there are two or more related dependent variables
(Hair et al., 1995).
13 For each treatment condition, weak, moderate and strong,
the mean (SD), F and p-values are: (1) profitability: 3.35
(0.59), 3.15 (0.88) and 3.65 (0.88), F = 2.025, p > 0.10; (2) liq-
uidity: 4.60 (0.94), 4.95 (0.99), 5.10 (1.16), F = 1.219, p >
0.10; (3) leverage: 3.85 (1.18), 3.40 (0.94), 3.55 (1.05), F =
0.931, p > 0.10; and (4) operating activity: 4.45 (0.61), 4.05
(0.95), 4.15 (0.75), F = 1.434, p > 0.10.
14 The F-values and relevant levels of significance for man-
agement integrity as a covariate in our analyses reported in
Tables 2 to 4 range between 1.653 (p = 0.19) to 0.972 (p =
0.413).
15 GOVSGH represents the three treatment conditions:
weak, moderate or strong governance.
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Table 1
Pearson correlations for audit judgment (dependent) variables (n = 60)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) ACCEPT 1.000
(2) INHRK –0.203 1.000
(3) CONRK –0.136 0.459*** 1.000
(4) PLAINTCT 0.306** –0.014 –0.357*** 1.000
(5) PLAUDHR –0.305** 0.236* 0.240* –0.209 1.000
(6) PLASUBT –0.294** 0.336*** 0.469*** –0.502*** 0.720*** 1.000
(7) PLASUBYE –0.312** 0.090 0.254** –0.734*** 0.420*** 0.504*** 1.000
Key to Table 1
ACCEPT Auditors’ client acceptance/rejection recommendation measured on a 1–6 point scale where
1–3 represents reject and 4–6 represents accept.
INHRK Auditors’ assessment of inherent risk measured on a 1–7 point scale where higher values indi-
cate greater risk.
CONRK Auditors’ assessment of control environment risk measured on a 1–7 point scale where higher
values indicate greater risk.
PLAINTCT Auditors’ assessment of the extent of planned reliance on the client’s internal controls meas-
ured on a 1–7 point scale where higher values indicate greater reliance.
PLAUDHR Auditors’ assessment of planned audit hours the client requires measured on a 1–7 point scale
where higher values indicate greater numbers of audit hours required.
PLASUBT Auditors’ assessment of the extent of planned substantive testing measured on a 1–7 point
scale where higher values indicate greater extent of testing.
PLASUBYE Auditors’ assessment of the extent of substantive tests planned for the year-end audit measured
on a 1–7 point scale where higher values indicate higher amounts of substantive tests planned. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10
when corporate governance is stronger, which pro-
vides partial support for our hypothesis.16
4.2.2. Corporate governance and risk assessments
Since the correlations in Table 1 indicate signifi-
cant correlations among auditors’assessment of con-
trol environment risk (CONRK) and auditors’ as-
sessment of inherent risk (INHRK), we test H2 using
a MANOVA. The MANOVA results in Table 3,
Panel A show that corporate governance (GOVS-
GH) significantly influences auditors’ risk assess-
ments (Wilks’Lambda = 0.749, F = 4.357, p < 0.01).
The mean (SD) ratings for INHRK are 4.25 (0.716),
3.90 (0.718) and 4.05 (1.234) for the weak, moder-
ate and strong governance treatment conditions, re-
spectively. The mean (SD) ratings for CONRK are
4.20 (0.951), 4.10 (0.852) and 3.25 (0.910) for the
weak, moderate and strong governance treatment
conditions, respectively. Analysis of Variance test re-
sults in Panel B show that CONRK (F = 6.645, p <
0.01) is significantly influenced by corporate gover-
nance whereas INHRK (F = 0.725, p > 0.10) is not.
Further analyses in Panel C indicate significant
differences in CONRK between the weak and strong
governance treatment conditions (p < 0.01), and be-
tween the moderate and strong governance treatment
conditions (p < 0.01). Surprisingly there is no differ-
ence in CONRK between the weak and moderate
conditions. We do not offer any explanation for this
observation. We believe further research is required
to confirm and understand our observation. Overall,
16 We also conduct Chi-square tests of the client acceptance
recommendation by analysing client acceptance and rejection
recommendations as a dichotomous variable. The six-point
scale for this judgment anchored scale-points 1–3 as reject and
4–6 as accept. There were seven reject recommendations
made by auditors in the weak governance condition and none
in the moderate and strong governance conditions. Our results
show auditors in the weak governance condition recommend
statistically significantly (χ2 = 35.267, p < 0.01) more client
rejections than the auditors in the moderate and strong gover-
nance conditions. There was no statistically significant differ-
ence in auditors’ client acceptance recommendations between
the moderate and strong governance conditions. We also note
that auditors in the weak governance condition made more
borderline recommendations (scores on the six-point scale as
3 and 4 – refer ‘Research Design and Method’ section) relative
to those in the moderate and strong governance conditions.
The percentages of auditors making such recommendations
are 70%, 30% and 25% for the weak, moderate and strong
governance conditions, respectively. These proportions differ
significantly between the weak, and the moderate and strong
governance conditions (χ2 = 43.000, p < 0.01).
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the results in Table 3 are consistent with our hypoth-
esis and suggest that when auditors perceive stronger
governance they lower their assessment of control
environment risk. The mean ratings for INHRK do
not vary significantly between the three treatment
conditions, implying that auditors do not emphasise
corporate governance when assessing inherent risk.
These results are consistent with Cohen et al. (2007).
4.2.3. Corporate governance and extent of
planned substantive testing 
We conduct a MANCOVA to test H3a, H3b and
H4 because of significant correlations among the
dependent variables, the extent of planned reliance
on the client’s internal controls (PLAINTCT), ex-
tent of planned substantive testing (PLASUBT),
and the extent of substantive tests planned for the
year-end (PLASUBYE). Auditors’ assessment of
control environment risk (CONRK)17 is the covari-
ate. The MANCOVA results in Table 4, Panel A
show the strength of corporate governance (GOVS-
GH) significantly influences PLAINTCT, PLA-
SUBT and PLASUBYE (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.669,
F = 4.012, p < 0.01). This effect is observed after
controlling for the effect of CONRK which is sig-
nificant as well (F = 4.317, p < 0.01). As presented
in Table 4, Panel B, the mean ratings (SD) for
PLAINTCT are 3.10 (0.852), 4.10 (0.968) and 4.70
(0.923) for the weak, moderate and strong gover-
nance treatment conditions, respectively. These
means are significantly different (F = 11.246, p <
0.01). Similarly, the mean ratings (SD) for PLA-
SUBT are 4.90 (0.968), 4.15 (0.875) and 3.75
(0.967) for the weak, moderate and strong gover-
nance treatment conditions, respectively, and they
are significantly different (F = 4.468, p < 0.05).18
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Table 2
Effect of the strength of corporate governance on auditors’ client acceptance judgment
Panel A: ANOVA of corporate governance strength (GOVSGH) on ACCEPT
F p Partial Eta Sq Power
Intercept 2359.401 0.000 0.976 1.000
GOVSGH 0011.356 0.000 0.285 0.990
Panel B: Summary statistics for ACCEPT
Weak governance Moderate governance Strong governance
n = 20 n = 20 n = 20
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F
ACCEPT 3.95 0.826 4.85 0.671 4.95 0.686 11.356***
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10
Panel C: Post-hoc analyses (difference in means) on ACCEPT
Weak v strong Weak v moderate Moderate v strong 
governance governance governance
ACCEPT 1.00 (4.327)*** 0.90 (3.894)*** 0.10 (0.424)
Key to Table 2
ACCEPT: Auditors’ client acceptance/rejection recommendation measured on a 1–6 point scale where
1–3 represents reject and 4–6 represents accept.
GOVSGH: Represents the three treatment conditions, weak, moderate or strong governance.
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10 (one-tailed significance)
17 We control for control environment risk for two reasons:
(1) theoretically, control environment risk affects the nature
and extent of substantive tests, and (2) our results show a sig-
nificant association between corporate governance and control
environment risk. Including control environment risk as a co-
variate allows us to distinguish and isolate the extent of influ-
ence corporate governance has on substantive tests. If we do
not include the covariate, CONRK, we find a more significant
and larger effect of GOVSGH (MANOVA results: Wilks
Lambda = 0.607, F = 5.197, p = 0.00, Partial Eta Squared =
0.221, and Power = 0.993) on auditors’ planning judgments
(PLAINTCT, PLASUBT and PLASUBYE). This suggests
that in some cases where the results are marginal, exclusion of
the covariate increases the significance of the effect of corpo-
rate governance.
18 The mean ratings (SD) for PLAUDHR (extent of planned
audit hours) are 4.90 (0.968), 4.40 (0.754), and 4.10 (0.718)
for the weak, moderate and strong governance conditions, re-
spectively, and are significantly different (F = 3.335, p < 0.05).
We exclude this variable from the MANCOVA at the sugges-
tion of a reviewer because it is highly correlated with PLA-
SUBT (r = 0.720, p < 0.01). Inclusion of this variable in the
MANCOVA does not affect the results.
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The results in Table 4, Panel B show that PLA-
SUBYE is significantly (F = 4.559, p < 0.05) influ-
enced by GOVSGH. The mean (SD) ratings for
PLASUBYE shown in Panel B are 4.75 (0.967),
4.10 (0.968) and 3.60 (1.095) for the weak, moder-
ate and strong governance treatment conditions, re-
spectively.
The results of our post-hoc analyses in Panel C
of Table 4 show significant differences (p < 0.05 or
better) in auditors’ ratings for PLAINTCT between
all treatment conditions. Similarly, PLASUBT is
significantly (p < 0.01) different between the weak
and strong, and weak and moderate governance
treatment conditions. It is marginally different 
(p < 0.10) between the moderate and strong gover-
nance treatment conditions. The results in Panel C
of Table 4 show PLASUBYE is significantly dif-
ferent between the weak and strong (p < 0.01), and
weak and moderate (p < 0.05) governance treat-
ment conditions, and marginally significantly 
(p < 0.10) different between the moderate and
strong governance treatment conditions.
Overall, our observations suggest that when au-
ditors perceive stronger corporate governance,
they increase their reliance on internal control and
reduce the extent of substantive testing. The con-
verse is true for weaker corporate governance.
These findings are consistent with H3a and H3b.
Similarly, our results imply that auditors plan a
greater extent of substantive testing during the 
interim period when corporate governance is
stronger. This is consistent with H4. Our results
provide empirical support for Cohen et al.’s (2002)
proposition. Based on their interviews with audi-
tors, Cohen et al. (2002) propose that stronger cor-
porate governance should allow auditors to rely on
the internal controls in place, and hence reduce the
extent of costly substantive testing. Our significant
results for the effect of the strength of corporate
governance on audit judgments are beyond that ex-
plained by control environment risk. This suggests
that corporate governance has implications that
extend beyond the control environment. Such a
view is consistent with the resource dependence
theory that argues corporate governance influences
corporate strategy and performance.
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Table 3
Effect of the strength of corporate governance on auditors’ risk judgments
Panel A: MANOVA of corporate governance strength (GOVSGH) on INHRK and CONRK
Wilks Lambda F p Partial Eta Sq Power
Intercept 0.037 736.044 0.000 0.963 1.000
GOVSGH 0.749 004.357 0.003 0.135 0.924
Panel B: Summary statistics and ANOVA for INHRK and CONRK
Weak governance Moderate governance Strong governance
n = 20 n = 20 n = 20
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F
INHRK 4.25 0.716 3.90 0.718 4.05 1.234 0.725
CONRK 4.20 0.951 4.10 0.852 3.25 0.910 6.645***
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10
Panel C: Post-hoc analyses (difference in means) on INHRK, CONRK and AUDRK
Weak v strong Weak v moderate Moderate v strong 
governance governance governance
INHRK 0.20 (0.685) 0.35 (1.199) 0.15 (0.514)
CONRK 0.95 (3.322)*** 0.10 (0.350) 0.85 (2.972)***
Key to Table 3
INHRK Auditors’ assessment of inherent risk measured on a 1–7 point scale where higher values indi-
cate greater risk.
CONRK Auditors’ assessment of control environment risk measured on a 1–7 point scale where higher
values indicate greater risk.
GOVSGH Represents the three treatment conditions, weak, moderate or strong governance.
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10 (one-tailed significance)
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Table 4
Effect of the strength of corporate governance on auditors’ planning judgments
Panel A: MANCOVA of corporate governance strength (GOVSGH) on PLAINTCT, PLASUBT and
PLASUBYE with CONRK as the covariate
Wilks Lambda F p Partial Eta Sq Power
Intercept 0.235 58.642 0.000 0.765 1.000
GOVSGH 0.669 04.012 0.001 0.182 0.966
CONRK 0.807 04.317 0.008 0.193 0.842
Panel B: Summary statistics and ANOVA for PLAINTCT, PLASUBT and PLASUBYE on GOVSGH
Weak governance Moderate governance Strong governance
n = 20 n = 20 n = 20
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F
PLAINTCT 3.10 0.852 4.10 0.968 4.70 0.923 11.246***
PLASUBT 4.90 0.968 4.15 0.875 3.75 0.967 4.468**
PLASUBYE 4.75 0.967 4.10 0.968 3.60 1.095 4.559**
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10
Panel C: Post-hoc analyses (difference in means) on PLAINTCT, PLASUBT and PLASUBYE
Weak v strong Weak v moderate Moderate v strong 
governance governance governance
PLAINTCT 1.60 (5.517)*** 1.00 (3.448)*** 0.60 (2.069)**
PLASUBT 1.15 (3.885)*** 0.75 (2.534)*** 0.40 (1.351)**
PLASUBYE 1.15 (3.538)*** 0.65 (2.031)*** 0.50 (1.563)**
Key to Table 4
PLAINTCT Auditors’ assessment of the extent of planned reliance on the client’s internal controls meas-
ured on a 1–7 point scale where higher values indicate greater reliance.
PLASUBT Auditors’ assessment of the extent of planned substantive testing measured on a 1–7 point
scale where higher values indicate greater extent of testing. 
PLASUBYE Auditors’ assessment of the extent of substantive tests planned for the year-end audit measured
on a 1–7 point scale where higher values indicate higher amounts of substantive tests planned.
CONRK Auditors’ assessment of control environment risk measured on 1–7 point scale where higher
values indicate greater risk. 
GOVSGH Represents the three treatment conditions, weak, moderate or strong governance.
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10 (one-tailed significance)
5. Discussion and conclusions
We hypothesise effects of the board and the audit
committee on a comprehensive set of audit judg-
ments in an institutional environment where 
corporate governance is not mandated by law 
but adoption is voluntary. Our results based on 60
Big 4 audit managers from Singapore show that
when corporate governance is stronger, auditors
make more favourable client acceptance recom-
mendations, assess lower control environment risk,
place greater reliance on internal controls, perform
less extensive substantive tests, and perform more
substantive testing at the interim audit.19 These re-
sults suggest that auditors in Singapore engage in
risk-adaptation strategies, which is consistent with
prior findings in the US (Messier and Plumlee,
1987; Maletta and Kida, 1993; Johnstone, 2000)
and more recent US governance research (e.g.
Cohen et al., 2007).
Our test results show that although auditors per-
ceive differences between the strong and moderate
corporate governance conditions, such differences
are perceived not as significant as those between
the weak and strong governance conditions. These
differences suggest that the risk reduction effect of
19 Conversion of our reported effect size statistics, the
Partial Eta-squared, in Tables 2 to 4 to its equivalent effect
size, f, yields a minimum effect size of 0.40 and a maximum
effect size of 0.63. The resultant fs are large effects (Cohen,
1988) and suggest that corporate governance has considerable
practical or economic significance for audit judgments. That
is, in addition to being statistically significant, our results in-
dicate that auditors find corporate governance important and
useful when making audit judgments. The statistical power re-
sults suggest our analyses are reliable and the inferences
drawn are valid.
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corporate governance on audit program planning
judgments is greater when corporate governance
improves from weak to strong than from moderate
to strong. 
Consistent with Cohen et al. (2007), we find no
significant effect of corporate governance on in-
herent risk. This could be due to one or more of the
following and deserves further research. First, be-
cause of knowledge-based dependence between
inherent risk and control environment risk
(Messier and Austen, 2000), auditors may have
given greater weight to corporate governance in
the control environment risk judgment than in the
inherent risk judgment. Second, it is possible that
auditors do not recognise corporate governance as
an inherent risk factor although it plays a signifi-
cant role in the strategic process of the organisa-
tion. Development of decision aids and/or training
may be useful to enhance auditors’ understanding
and utilisation of corporate governance informa-
tion when making inherent risk, and perhaps, other
audit judgments.20
There are limitations in our study. First, our ma-
nipulation of the resource dependence aspect of
corporate governance was limited to the structure
of the board and audit committee. We encourage
future research to manipulate board processes (e.g.
directors’ involvement in board activities, number
of board sub-committees directors serve on, indus-
try networks) to provide greater insight on how
various dimensions of resource dependence as-
pects of governance affect decision making.
Second, we manipulate corporate governance
treatment on an assumption that the strength of the
audit committee derives linearly from the board.
That is, the audit committee is strong (weak) when
the board of directors is strong (weak). Future re-
search may manipulate the strength of both the
board of directors and audit committee to allow for
the possibility, particularly in voluntary gover-
nance environments, of a strong board with a weak
audit committee and vice versa. In addition, we do
not investigate how differences between Singapore
and the Western economies, in respect of culture
and institutional factors such as legal protection
and ownership structure, affect corporate gover-
nance and auditors’ judgments.
Since the participants in our experiment are lim-
ited to audit managers from the Big 4 audit firms,
our findings might not be generalisable to other
staff levels and to non-Big 4 firms. Nevertheless,
audit managers are frequently called to make client
acceptance recommendations in practice, which
likely influence audit partners’ decisions. We hold
the industry, financial condition and size of the hy-
pothetical client constant for all three treatment
conditions. Future research may explore how these
factors interact with corporate governance and af-
fect auditors’ judgments. Finally, we acknowledge
that when auditors make client acceptance and
planning judgments, they consider the potential
billing rate, cost of the audit and the risk-return
trade-off. These considerations are likely to vary
across client characteristics such as size, financial
condition, industry, public or non-public company,
management reputation, and the risks of the spe-
cific accounting-cycle. While we control these fac-
tors by holding them constant across our
experimental conditions, our results are limited to
the extent such characteristics may influence audi-
tors’ judgments. Further research could consider
the economic impact of these client characteristics
and corporate governance on audit judgments.
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